Twenty-fifth International Workshop on Security Protocols
Cambridge, England, March 20-22, 2017
In recent work on open, privacy-preserving, accountable surveillance, we have proposed the use of cryptographic protocols that enable law-enforcement and intelligence agencies to obtain actionable information about targeted users of mass-communication systems without intruding on the privacy of untargeted users. Our suggestion that appropriate technology, combined with sound policy and the rule of law, can afford typical users significantly more privacy than they have now without hindering lawful and effective actions by law-enforcement and intelligence agencies has met with considerable skepticism. In this paper, we summarize the principal objections to our approach and address them.
This work was supported by US National Science Foundation grants CNS1407454 and CNS-1409599, William and Flora Hewlett Foundation grant 2016-3834, and the AXA Research Fund.
We are grateful to our collaborator and former student Aaron Segal for all of his good work in this area and for helpful discussions.